Time to stop avoiding the tax avoidance issue in Croatia? A proposal based on recent developments in the European Union by Stjepan Gad&#382 & Irena Klemen&#269
Time to stop avoiding  
the tax avoidance issue  
in Croatia?  
A proposal based  
on recent developments  
in the European Union
STJEPAN GADŽO, LL.M.*  
IRENA KLEMENČIĆ, LL.M.*
Review article**
JEL: K34
doi: 10.3326/fintp.38.3.2
*   The authors would like to thank three anonymous referees for their useful comments and suggestions. 
** Received: May 23, 2014
  Accepted: July 11, 2014
A previous version of this paper was presented at the conference Tax Reforms: Experiences and Perspectives 
organized by the Institute of Public Finance, Faculty of Economics and Business, Zagreb and Faculty of 
  Economics, Rijeka in Zagreb on June 20, 2014.
Stjepan GADŽO
University of Rijeka, Faculty of Law, Hahlić 6, 51000 Rijeka, Croatia
e-mail: sgadzo@pravri.hr
Irena KLEMENČIĆ
Institute of Public Finance, Smičiklasova 21, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia 
e-mail: irena.klemencic@ijf.hrs
t
j
e
p
a
n
 
g
a
d
ž
o
,
 
i
r
e
n
a
 
k
l
e
m
e
n
č
i
ć
:
t
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
o
p
 
a
v
o
i
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
x
 
a
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
 
i
s
s
u
e
 
i
n
 
c
r
o
a
t
i
a
?
 
a
 
p
r
o
p
o
s
a
l
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
r
e
c
e
n
t
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
u
n
i
o
n
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
2
7
7
-
3
0
2
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
278 Abstract
The paper takes a tax policy perspective in analysing the approach to tax avoid-
ance in Croatia and expounding its existing shortcomings. It is argued that Croatia 
is yet to develop a coherent legislative framework suitable for curbing tax avoid-
ance in an equitable, efficient and simple way. One instrument that has hitherto 
been ignored is the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR), a keystone of anti-avoid-
ance policies in other countries. The authors propose the introduction of a spe-
cific  GAAR,  based  on  recent  developments  in  the  European  Union  (EU),  in 
Croatian tax legislation. This proposal is supported by multiple tax policy argu-
ments. Special emphasis is placed on the requirements of legal certainty, a tradi-
tional weak spot of the Croatian tax system. The proposal is put in the context of 
the persistent quest for a sustainable public finance system in times of crisis. 
Keywords: tax avoidance, tax abuse, general anti-avoidance rule, GAAR, EU tax 
law, wholly artificial arrangements, tax policy
1 IntroductIon
“The avoidance of taxes is the only intellectual pursuit   
that still carries any reward.”
(J. M. Keynes)1
Ever since its comprehensive reform in 1994 the Croatian tax system has exhib-
ited a distinct lack of any coherent approach to tax avoidance. While global trends 
have  been  followed  in  introducing  numerous  targeted  anti-avoidance  rules 
(TAARs), there is a gaping absence of statutory provisions able to curb more com-
plex tax avoidance schemes. Legislative instruments that fit this purpose are the 
so-called general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs), recently on the rise in a number 
of countries (Ernst & Young, 2013), largely due to growing concerns about wealthy 
individuals and multinational corporations (MNCs) not paying their “fair share” 
in the financing of public services. Tax avoidance currently ranks high on the tax 
policy agenda worldwide, as evidenced by the G8 and G20 meetings of 2013 and 
other developments at the regional and the international level (e.g., the OECD 
project on tax base erosion and profit shifting).
The institutions of the European Union have also taken the initiative in this area, 
stressing the need for a uniform anti-avoidance approach in all of the EU member 
states. One of its envisaged cornerstones is the “EU GAAR”, as proposed by the 
European Commission (EC) in its non-binding recommendation of 2012. The 
  proposal is based on the anti-avoidance approach developed by the EU judiciary 
in the past, which has had a strong influence on member states’ national legisla-
tion. Because EU institutions have no competence in tax matters, the proposal’s 
effects are contingent on the national tax policy choices of each member state. 
1 As cited in Perrou (2006).s
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279 This paper takes a tax policy perspective in claiming that the time has come for the 
introduction of a GAAR – modelled after the EC’s proposal – in the Croatian tax 
system. The arguments go beyond the traditional examination of GAAR’s influence 
on efficiency and equity, those paramount tax-policy objectives. GAAR’s potential 
in recovering public revenues lost to tax avoidance activities and in narrowing the 
tax gap via improvements in tax compliance levels is highly important in the era of 
fiscal consolidation. Therefore, its introduction would give a strong signal to the 
country’s creditors that the government is acting responsibly in imposing and col-
lecting taxes, which is a prerequisite for sustainable public finance system. Given 
that Croatian public finances are currently undergoing the surveillance procedure by 
the EU institutions, this point deserves special emphasis. Furthermore, it is argued 
that the introduction of an “EU-style GAAR” could have positive effects on legal 
certainty – of particular concern for the all stakeholders in Croatia – particularly if it 
is accompanied with the adoption of other instruments enhancing the relationship 
between the tax authorities and taxpayers, e.g. advance rulings.
The paper is organised as follows. After the introduction, section two highlights 
the importance of the tax avoidance issue for tax policy and the role of a GAAR 
in that context. Section three analyses the added complexity of anti-avoidance 
policies in member states of the EU. It also introduces the EC proposal on a uni-
form EU GAAR and gives a brief overview of experiences with GAARs in se-
lected crisis-stricken member states (Spain, Italy and Portugal). Section four deals 
with the anti-avoidance approach in Croatia hitherto and provides the authors’ 
proposal for the introduction of a GAAR in the Croatian tax system. The fifth sec-
tion contains a summary of the main findings. 
2 AntI-AvoIdAnce tAx polIcy And the role of A GAAr
Tax policy is the art of making numerous decisions about tax structure and tax 
design. From a normative perspective, these decisions and their effects are typi-
cally evaluated using three criteria: equity, efficiency and administrability (Avi 
Yonah, 2006). In simple terms, tax policymakers must, simultaneously, strive to 
make the tax system as equitable (fair), economically efficient and easy-to-admin-
ister as possible. It is well established in the theory of public finance that the at-
tainment of these goals is influenced by the reality of taxpayers’ behavioural re-
sponses to taxation (Slemrod and Yithzaki, 2002). In every country there is a 
certain percentage of taxpayers who do not comply with their obligations pre-
scribed in the tax statutes. Tax compliance is a complex subject that cannot be 
explained using only the economics-of-crime approach, i.e. considering factors 
such as penalty schedule and probability of detection (Alm, 2012). Other factors, 
like tax morale and social norms, also have an influence on the tax compliance 
level (Torgler and Schaltegger, 2006). While expounding the possible underlying 
causes of tax non-compliance goes beyond the scope of this paper, their under-
standing is of vital importance in tax policy-making (Tooma, 2008)2.
2 For a comprehensive survey of tax non-compliance reasons and patterns see Andreoni, Erard and Fein-
stein (1998).s
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2.1   the elusIve concept of tAx AvoIdAnce And the ImportAnce  
of “lIne drAwInG”
Two general types of tax non-compliance must be distinguished: (1) tax evasion, 
and (2) tax avoidance. This dichotomy is discernible from the legal perspective. 
Whereas tax evasion denotes behaviour that is illegal, i.e. contrary to the letter of 
the tax law, tax avoidance stands for behaviour that is legal, i.e. in accordance with 
the letter of the tax law, but frustrates the underlying purpose of the relevant legal 
rules3. It is far easier to detect tax evasion, within the broad spectrum of illegal 
actions taxpayers take with the goal of reducing their tax liability. Typical exam-
ples include income underreporting, fraudulent invoicing for VAT purposes and 
undervaluation of property value (Alm, 2012). In contrast, characterising a kind of 
behaviour as tax avoidance poses a serious challenge for the tax administration 
and the taxpayers themselves. This is a natural consequence of the inherent vague-
ness and ambiguity of the notion of tax avoidance, particularly if compared to 
notions such as “tax planning”, “tax mitigation”, or “tax minimization”. As the 
goal of this paper is to provide a proposal to policymakers to combat tax avoid-
ance using legislative instruments – more specifically a GAAR – it is useful to 
start with an attempt to elucidate the concept of tax avoidance.
One has to note first that taxpayers can make a variety of choices and decisions 
which directly influence their tax liability. In fact, one of the general design fea-
tures of tax systems is the dependency of tax liability upon the “economic reality 
that has previously been regulated, classified or characterised by other branches of 
law (commerce or other private law)” (Ruiz Almendral, 2005). Therefore, taxpay-
ers are generally free to choose the legal form of their economic activities, which 
may profoundly affect the amount of tax due. Classic examples include the choice 
of financing business activity with debt or equity or the option of undertaking a 
business activity in a corporate form. Tax planning is the umbrella term used to 
describe a vast array of legal activities aimed at reducing or deferring the tax lia-
bility, i.e. optimizing the tax position of a person. Tax avoidance is, in comparison, 
equated with those tax planning activities which are in some way considered “il-
legitimate” or “unacceptable” (Russo, 2007). For the sake of clarity the term tax 
planning (or tax mitigation) is used below only in respect of those activities that 
are acceptable and permissible from the tax policymakers’ perspective (Atkinson, 
2012). 
Admittedly, attempts at producing a precise definition of tax avoidance do not 
only represent a challenging task – it is asserted that the term “does not have a 
limiting and definite meaning” (Barker, 2009) – but also bear little significance for 
tax policy. The focus should instead be on drawing the line between (acceptable) 
tax planning and (unacceptable) tax avoidance. Two aspects need to be empha-
sized against this backdrop: firstly, the issue of the criteria that ought to be em-
3 This general depiction of evasion and avoidance can be viewed as an oversimplification, particularly from 
the tax lawyers’ standpoint. For a more nuanced discussion about the evasion/avoidance dichotomy see Uck-
mar (1983).s
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281 ployed in the line-drawing, and secondly, the issue of institutional competence in 
the development of these criteria. The former usually entails the consideration of 
the purpose of a taxpayer’s legal arrangements, which may be established on a 
subjective or objective basis (Zimmer, 2002). Accordingly, activities conducted 
with the sole or main purpose of gaining a tax benefit, contrary to the underlying 
intent of the applicable law, are deemed to have crossed the borderline into tax 
avoidance (Cooper, 2001). The latter aspect pertains to the role of the legislative 
and judiciary branch of government in establishing and developing anti-avoidance 
doctrines. While in some countries – particularly those of common law legal sys-
tems (e.g. USA) – the judiciary has taken an “activist” approach with a remarkable 
degree of freedom and creativity in delimiting the notion of tax avoidance (Brown, 
2012), in other countries – not limited only to those of civil law legal systems (e.g. 
Belgium, Germany, Sweden) – the role of the judiciary is restricted, principally on 
the basis of constitutional limitations to the power of taxation (Zimmer, 2002; 
Vanistaendel, 1996). This is an important point for tax policymakers, as the deci-
sion to curb tax avoidance with legislative instruments is heavily influenced by the 
extent and efficacy of judicial intervention in this area (Arnold, 2008). 
Irrespective of the approach and instruments used for its delimitation, there are 
various persuasive arguments why tax avoidance needs to be recognized as an 
important tax policy issue. First and foremost, tax avoidance behaviour under-
mines the attainment of the main normative criteria used to evaluate the tax policy. 
Fairness is endangered because tax avoidance narrows the tax base and changes 
the relative shares of tax burden among taxpayers (Tax Law Review Committee, 
1997), presumably – due to the inequality of avoidance opportunities – to the 
detriment of lower income groups (Hillman, 2009). From the standpoint of eco-
nomic efficiency, tax avoidance is considered to be “socially wasteful in that it 
results in distorted choices made on a basis other than the marginal social cost and 
benefit of an economic activity” (Hyman, 2011). Furthermore, the proliferation of 
avoidance schemes adds to the complexity of the tax legislation, as legislators try 
to close specific loopholes (Tax Law Review Committee, 1997), which inevitably 
increases the compliance and administrative costs of taxation. 
Moreover, in the post-crisis era of fiscal consolidation, other negative effects of 
tax avoidance seem to play a more important role in the policymaking process. 
One direct macroeconomic effect of tax avoidance is the revenue loss for the gov-
ernment (Tooma, 2008), which is of special concern for countries faced simulta-
neously  with  daunting  budget  deficits  and  public  debt  limits.  Accordingly, 
strengthened anti-avoidance measures form one part of the wider tax base-broad-
ening strategy employed for the revenue side of the fiscal consolidation (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2013). Finally, the fact that the public outrage at tax avoid-
ance, widely perceived as a prerogative of MNCs and wealthy individuals, has 
been picked up by the politicians (Freedman, 2012) cannot be underestimated. 
Anti-avoidance currently ranks high on the agenda of multilateral organizations 
– notably G20, OECD and the EU – encouraging the higher degree of inter-gov-s
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282 ernmental coordination necessary to restrain those avoidance schemes that exploit 
the deficiencies of the international tax regime (Ernst & Young, 2013). 
2.2 GAAr As A polIcy tool In combAtInG tAx AvoIdAnce
Legislative anti-avoidance instruments can be divided into two groups: targeted 
anti-avoidance rules (TAARs) and general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs). The tax 
systems of many countries contain both (Ernst & Young, 2013). The main differ-
ence lies in their scope of application, i.e. the type of behaviour they are targeted 
at. While TAARs are aimed at curbing specific tax avoidance techniques, e.g. 
abusive transfer pricing or debt financing, GAARs can be applied on a much 
broader scale, forming a sort of “catch-all” anti-avoidance tool (Ostwal and Vi-
jaraghavan, 2010). The fundamental role of a GAAR is to draw a statutory line 
between acceptable tax planning and unacceptable tax avoidance, by providing 
the tax administration and the courts a set of parameters they can take into account 
when deciding on the acceptability of a taxpayers’ tax reduction behaviour (Brown, 
2012). 
Although GAARs vary in form in different countries, some common design fea-
tures can be identified. Firstly, a GAAR can be applied only if a taxpayer’s ar-
rangement – a term that is usually defined very broadly (Atkinson, 2012) – results 
in a tax benefit (e.g. exclusion of a certain item of income from the tax base) that 
would not arise but for the arrangement (Cooper, 2001). 
More importantly, the application of a GAAR depends on the sought purpose of 
the taxpayer’s arrangement. It is applied if the purpose of the arrangement was to 
obtain the tax benefit, thus invoking the conclusion that tax avoidance is a pur-
pose-based notion (Cooper, 2001). Even though ascertaining the taxpayer’s pur-
pose, an inherently mental element of the arrangement, may appear complicated, 
some objective conditions (e.g. the commercial substance of the arrangement) can 
act as meaningful proxies, as demonstrated by many existing GAARs (Ernst & 
Young, 2013). An obvious problem in this regard is that “the tax purpose” of an 
arrangement can hardly be discerned from its commercial purpose. From the tax-
payers’ perspective, tax benefits maximize their total net returns, which provides 
sound commercial reasons for the arrangement (Cooper, 2001). From the policy-
makers’ perspective, as demonstrated above, it is imperative to draw the line be-
tween tax planning and tax avoidance behaviour, and the taxpayer’s purpose cri-
terion seems ill-suited to achieve this goal (Atkinson, 2012). After all, a number 
of tax-motivated activities are encouraged and supported by the policymakers, 
and the widespread use of tax expenditures demonstrates the importance of the 
so-called regulatory function of taxation (Avi Yonah, 2006). What then defines a 
tax motivated activity as tax avoidance, to be confronted with a GAAR, is the 
compatibility of its results (i.e. tax benefits obtained) with the purpose of the per-
tinent tax law, i.e. underlying tax policy goals (Arnold, 2008; Cooper, 2001). In 
other words, the constitutive element of a tax avoidance scheme is the abuse of the 
(tax) law (Ruiz Almendral, 2005), which is recognized in the GAARs of most s
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283 countries (Arnold, 2008). A further difficulty in making the application of a GAAR 
dependent on the taxpayer’s purpose lies in the relative weight assigned to other 
possible purposes of the taxpayer’s arrangement. While there is no common stand-
ard (Atkinson, 2013), the existence of a significant non-tax purpose usually ex-
cludes the application of a GAAR (Cooper, 2001)4.
If the abovementioned conditions for its application in respect of particular tax-
payer’s arrangement are satisfied, a GAAR gives to the tax administration the 
power to cancel or otherwise disallow the tax benefits obtained (Ernst & Young, 
2013). Moreover, many GAARs empower the tax administration to reconstruct 
the arrangement on the basis of the determined economic reality and to impose tax 
on the basis of the reconstructed arrangement at a later date (Prebble and Prebble, 
2010). While it is clear that the conferral of such broad powers on the administra-
tive bodies poses some serious issues of its own (Cooper, 2001), this is an inevi-
table element of a GAAR. In any case, the policymakers should make sure that 
other design features of a GAAR are formed in such a way as to provide sufficient 
guidance for the administrators to apply it correctly. One of the technical solutions 
that serve this purpose is the setting up of a special advisory body, the so-called 
GAAR panel, with the task of protecting taxpayers’ interests and giving advice to 
the tax administration (Ernst & Young, 2013). 
2.3   GAAr And the bAlAnce of polIcy objectIves:  
problem of leGAl certAInty
Integrating the standard design features described above, a GAAR is primarily a 
line-drawing mechanism used for tax avoidance delimitation. In addition, it ena-
bles the cancellation of tax benefits obtained via taxpayers’ arrangements qualified 
as avoidance schemes ex post, upon the tax authorities’ initiative and subject to 
judiciary review. In this fashion a GAAR can promote the attainment of tax eq-
uity and efficiency. Potential effects of a GAAR on equity and efficiency can be 
analysed in terms of an optimal trade-off between rules and standards in tax law 
(Weisbach, 2002). Against this backdrop a GAAR can be characterised as an anti-
avoidance standard, which – as comprehensively discussed by Weisbach (2002) 
– reduces the elasticity of taxable income and can enhance the efficiency of the tax 
system. Moreover, a consequence of increased efficiency is that the redistribution 
of income becomes cheaper, leading to more progressivity, i.e. to an increase of 
the vertical equity of the tax system (Weisbach, 2002). 
The most emphasised disadvantage of a GAAR is its supposedly negative impact 
on the values of the rule of law, above all on legal certainty. Legal certainty is not 
only a paramount rule of law value in modern liberal democracies, but also – in a 
more narrow tax context – one of the main principles of taxation, endorsed as 
early as the work of Adam Smith (Tooma, 2008). In general, legal certainty entails 
4 Using the comparative approach, Arnold (2008) observes that GAARs in different countries employ differ-
ent tests of taxpayers’ purpose, namely “sole or dominant purpose test”, “main, primary or principal purpose 
test” and “one of the main purposes test”. s
t
j
e
p
a
n
 
g
a
d
ž
o
,
 
i
r
e
n
a
 
k
l
e
m
e
n
č
i
ć
:
t
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
o
p
 
a
v
o
i
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
x
 
a
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
 
i
s
s
u
e
 
i
n
 
c
r
o
a
t
i
a
?
 
a
 
p
r
o
p
o
s
a
l
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
r
e
c
e
n
t
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
u
n
i
o
n
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
2
7
7
-
3
0
2
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
284 the commitment of the state to guarantee all individuals the possibility to foresee 
the legal consequences of their and other social subjects’ behaviour (Zolo, 2007). 
Thus their behaviour should be governed by law, i.e. by legal rules that meet cer-
tain criteria, in such a way as to provide adequate guidance (Atkinson, 2012). 
Applied to taxation, legal certainty requires that the taxpayers are able to deter-
mine the tax implications of their activities ex ante (Atkinson, 2012).
In this context a standard criticism has been that a GAAR offends the requirement 
of legal certainty, due to its inability to draw a clear line between tax avoidance 
and tax planning (Prebble and Prebble, 2010). It is argued that a GAAR cannot 
provide sufficient guidance to taxpayers in their arrangement of their affairs, while 
concurrently giving broad discretionary powers to the tax authorities to target nu-
merous taxpayers’ activities. As Cooper (2001) notices, however, the argument is 
rarely developed beyond these general assumptions. Even if one takes the argu-
ment as self-evident, there remains the question of whether some alternative solu-
tions to the tax avoidance issue would provide more satisfactory results. One ob-
vious alternative is the increasing reliance on TAARs, more specific and thus more 
certain rules. TAARs are desirable as a policy weapon against some widespread 
and well-known avoidance schemes – transfer pricing inevitably springs to mind 
– but they are not a feasible long-term solution (Cooper, 2001). Taxpayers and 
their advisors can circumvent a TAAR more easily and as policymakers try to plug 
an identified statutory loophole with yet another TAAR, a vicious circle of in-
creasing complexity in the tax law is created (Thurony, 2003), which only pro-
duces more uncertainty (Freedman, 2004). Furthermore, it is argued that the very 
fact that policymakers opt for the introduction of a GAAR indicates their aware-
ness of the inherent unpredictability of taxpayers’ avoidance structures (Prebble 
and Prebble, 2010).
Criticism of a GAAR founded on the “certainty argument” may be considered 
misguided from two aspects. Firstly, certainty is neither the primary aim of nor a 
yardstick for a GAAR (Freedman, 2004). There are other policy objectives (e.g., 
equity, efficiency, revenue recovery) it aims to achieve and which need be used in 
its evaluation. In order to effectively achieve these objectives a GAAR must nec-
essarily be constructed vaguely, at least to some extent (Prebble and Prebble, 
2010). Secondly, legal certainty is not the sole virtue that must be respected by the 
tax policymakers. In fact, it is in direct conflict with the requirements of equity 
and efficiency (Zimmer, 2002). Thus the true challenge for the policymakers is to 
find the appropriate balance between these competing objectives, providing ap-
propriate guidance for the taxpayers’ behaviour on the one hand and the tax ad-
ministration with an effective tool to restrain manifold avoidance schemes on the 
other.
Regardless of the stated inappropriateness of using legal certainty as a benchmark 
for evaluating a GAAR, some authors have challenged the standard claim that the 
introduction of a GAAR reduces certainty. The starting point of the counterargu-s
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285 ment is Ronald Dworkin’s (1978) theory about the dichotomy between rules and 
principles. Against this backdrop, Avery Jones (1996) and Braithwhite (2002) 
have advocated the use of more general principles instead of specific rules in the 
anti-avoidance  legislation.  Principles  are  useful  in  determining  what  the  rule 
means, i.e. in the interpretation of tax law (Avery Jones, 1996), and the combina-
tion of principles – such as a GAAR – and specific rules helps to build an inte-
grated system of tax law, thus promoting a greater certainty (Braithwhite, 2002). 
Freedman (2004) has further developed the argument for using a GAAR as a gen-
eral tax law principle, with the aim of providing a sensible regulatory framework 
in deciding which behaviour is acceptable and which is not. This argument, stem-
ming from legal philosophy, can be reconciled with the economic analysis of the 
effects of general standards and specific rules, which provides the starting basis 
for Weisbach’s (2002) above-mentioned analysis of anti-avoidance doctrines’ ef-
ficiency. 
3 AntI-AvoIdAnce polIcy In the eu context
For countries that are member states of the EU policing tax avoidance has an extra 
dimension (Prebble and Prebble, 2008). Namely, the requirements of the EU law, 
i.e. that special body of law stemming from the international treaties signed by the 
EU member states, must be observed in the design of national anti-avoidance 
policy. It should first be emphasised that – due to the lack of competence con-
ferred by the member states on the EU institutions in this area – at the moment 
there are no EU taxes and there is no genuine EU tax policy (Terra and Wattel, 
2012). On the other hand, principle of the supremacy of EU law over member 
states’ national legislation puts significant restrictions on the national tax policy-
makers (Pistone, 2008). 
This adds yet another layer of complexity in the anti-avoidance area. A compara-
tive overview of EU member states’ anti-avoidance legislation confirms the well-
established view that the approach to tax avoidance is unique in every country 
(Edgar, 2008), and reveals that no general European-wide principles may be ex-
tracted from the national level (De Monès et al., 2010). In contrast, the require-
ments of EU law have a harmonizing effect, by setting the limitations national 
anti-avoidance rules need to be aligned with. Naturally, the limitations apply only 
if a transaction or an arrangement is carried out in the EU context, i.e. is covered 
by the provisions of EU law. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
the only institution competent for the interpretation of EU law, has in numerous 
cases decided on the compatibility of national anti-avoidance rules and EU law, 
resulting in the development of an implicit concept of tax avoidance applicable in 
the EU context (Weber, 2005).
3.1   delImItAtIon of tAx AvoIdAnce In the cAse-lAw of the court  
of justIce of the europeAn unIon
The CJEU’s reasoning in “tax avoidance cases” is derived from the prohibition of 
the abuse of law, a newly recognized general principle of EU law. Put simply, s
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286 taxpayers cannot rely on the provisions of EU law if their behaviour constitutes 
abuse of the pertinent law. As the CJEU recognized very early the acceptability of 
tax planning activities that entail the use of EU internal market benefits (Schön, 
2008), the line had to be drawn between abusive practices, i.e. tax avoidance be-
haviour and legitimate tax planning. Two landmark decisions of the CJEU serve 
this purpose. 
Decision in the Halifax case (CJEU, 2006a) showed clearly that two elements 
constitute abusive behaviour. Firstly, the transactions gave rise to a tax advantage 
contrary to the purpose of pertinent rules of EU law (the “objective element”). 
Secondly, the essential aim of the transactions was to obtain a tax advantage (the 
“subjective element”). Since the Halifax case was about the abuse of provisions of 
the EU VAT Directive, the question lingered whether the same or similar test 
could be applied in the tax areas largely unharmonised at the EU level, such as 
direct taxes. The Cadbury Schweppes decision (CJEU 2006b) plays a key role in 
this regard. In that case the compatibility of national anti-avoidance rules (namely, 
CFC rules) with the EU freedom of establishment was tested. The CJEU made it 
clear that market freedoms can be restricted using the tax avoidance argument 
only in cases of “wholly artificial arrangements”. The CJEU planted the seed for 
the development of this influential doctrine as early as 1998 in its ICI decision 
(Schön, 2013). After Cadbury Schweppes it became clear that a two-pronged test 
needs to be used in defining wholly artificial arrangements (Lampreave, 2012). 
The test is very similar to that applied in Halifax. The subjective prong consists of 
the analysis of the taxpayer’s purpose, with special emphasis on the search for 
valid business purpose of the arrangement, other than the acquisition of the tax 
benefit. The objective prong involves the analysis of the economic reality of the 
arrangement, where the lack of economic substance exposes the artificiality of the 
arrangement. 
Subsequent case law of the CJEU seems to confirm the view – subject to some 
ambiguities – that a single anti-abuse theory underlies decisions in Halifax and 
Cadbury Schweppes cases (Jimenez, 2012). From the tax policy perspective, it is 
essential to note that the CJEU’s approach in tax avoidance cases shares features 
remarkably similar to those found in statutory GAARs. More specifically, the de-
cisive criteria CJEU uses in delimiting the notion of tax avoidance are: (1) the 
purpose of the EU law relied upon by the economic operator (objective element), 
(2) the intent of the economic operator to obtain tax benefits via abuse of the per-
tinent EU law (subjective element), and (3) the relative weight assigned to the “tax 
saving intent” and to other, commercial (business) aims of the transaction(s) con-
cerned. Hence it is argued that the CJEU has developed a fully-fledged GAAR 
applicable in the EU context (Sinfield, 2011). While hitherto the compatibility of 
member states’ GAARs with the “EU GAAR” has not been tested before the 
CJEU, there is abundant case law concerning various national TAARs (Ruiz Al-
mendral, 2013), confirming the view that national anti-avoidance rules need to 
follow the boundaries laid down by the EU law. This “negative integration” of s
t
j
e
p
a
n
 
g
a
d
ž
o
,
 
i
r
e
n
a
 
k
l
e
m
e
n
č
i
ć
:
t
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
o
p
 
a
v
o
i
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
x
 
a
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
 
i
s
s
u
e
 
i
n
 
c
r
o
a
t
i
a
?
 
a
 
p
r
o
p
o
s
a
l
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
r
e
c
e
n
t
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
u
n
i
o
n
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
2
7
7
-
3
0
2
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
287 member states’ tax systems5 is problematic from the tax policy standpoint, since 
CJEU is not an institution whose task is to model tax policy (Dahlberg, 2007).
3.2   movInG towArds unIform stAtutory GAAr In the eu: 
commIssIon’s recommendAtIon on AGGressIve tAx plAnnInG
In December 2012 European Commission (EC) issued the Recommendation on 
Aggressive Tax Planning, a non-binding act addressed to the EU member states, 
sketching the outline of a harmonized EU approach to the most aggressive types 
of tax avoidance behaviour. One of its most ambitious points is the proposal for 
the adoption of a uniform GAAR in all member states, to be applied equally in 
purely domestic, intra-EU and third-country situations (Lyons, 2013). The word-
ing of the proposed GAAR is based on the anti-avoidance case law of the CJEU. 
The “wholly artificial arrangements” doctrine, as delineated in Cadbury Schweppes, 
is of particular influence, as the application of the proposed GAAR is restricted 
only to artificial arrangements – i.e. arrangements lacking commercial substance 
– or artificial series of arrangements, set up with the essential purpose of tax avoid-
ance and leading to tax benefit (EC, 2012). The Recommendation also contains an 
exemplary, non-exhaustive list of arrangements lacking commercial substance, 
and provides definitions of other terms used in the wording of the proposed 
GAAR; namely, definitions of “an arrangement”, “essential purpose of tax avoid-
ance” and “tax benefit” are contained. When all of the conditions for the applica-
tion of the proposed GAAR are met, tax authorities are to treat artificial arrange-
ments by reference to their economic substance, i.e. they are granted the power of 
re-characterisation. 
It is apparent that the EC is well aware of the shortages of negative integration 
approach in the tax avoidance area. Legal certainty and competitiveness in the 
internal market can be truly enhanced only via positive integration, i.e. via codifi-
cation of harmonized rules at the EU level (Sinfield, 2011). In this context, EU 
institutions’ lack of competence in regulating tax matters poses a familiar obsta-
cle. On the other hand, “soft law” mechanisms, such as the abovementioned EC 
Recommendation, could have a higher chance of success in a changed economic 
environment. The latest economic crisis and ensuing EU sovereign debt crisis has 
demonstrated that the flaws of member states’ national tax systems may become 
an EU-wide problem. Member states seeking financial assistance from the EU 
institutions have been faced with obligations relating to the improvement of tax 
potential through higher compliance levels, including a more serious approach to 
tax evasion and tax avoidance (Lyons, 2013). This is best evidenced by the tax 
reforms in Greece – a country that epitomises the Eurozone crisis – of 2013. 
Among other measures aimed at combating tax non-compliance, a GAAR has 
been introduced in the Greek tax system for the first time (Stathis, 2014). The 
wording of the new rule – effective as of January 1st 2014 – is overwhelmingly 
5 About the dichotomy between positive and negative integration of EU member states’ tax systems see Terra 
and Wattel, 2012, pp. 36-39.s
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288 reminiscent of the uniform EU GAAR proposed by the EC, with the existence of 
artificial arrangements being the main condition for its application.
3.3 GAArs In selected crIsIs-strIcken eu member stAtes
A number of EU member states have opted for the introduction of a GAAR as an 
instrument to curb tax avoidance some time before the full development of an EU 
GAAR in CJEU case law. Some of these countries have since been deeply af-
fected by the economic crisis, entailing the necessity of tax policy reconsidera-
tions. The depiction of different GAARs introduced in Spain, Italy and Portugal 
can provide useful insights for tax policymakers in Croatia, a new EU member 
state with a similar legal tradition and comparable levels of factors influencing tax 
compliance, e.g. tax morale (McGee and Tyler, 2006). All three countries under 
consideration introduced a GAAR in their tax system long before the beginning of 
the crisis in 2008, with the aim of achieving an equitable allocation of the tax 
burden and increasing the collection of tax revenues. While Italy has developed a 
strong judicial GAAR accompanied by statutory TAARs, Spain and Portugal have 
introduced a statutory GAAR. A strong influence of the EU law – and the CJEU 
anti-avoidance approach in particular – is notable in all three countries. Even in 
areas not harmonised with EU legislation – such as direct taxation – many features 
have been subject to judicial assessment and therefore indirectly harmonized 
(Ruiz Almendral, 2005). 
The Spanish tax system contains a GAAR, applicable in cases of conflicts in the 
application of tax rules, and TAARs, intended to prevent specific transactions or 
application of different tax treatments sought by the parties (Clifford Chance, 2013). 
As the previous provision was hardly ever used during forty years, a new GAAR 
was enacted by the General Tax Code of 2003 – replacing previous GAARs which 
have been in use since 1963 – with the aim of revitalising its use by the tax admin-
istration and the courts by defining tax avoidance in a clearer manner (Ruiz Almen-
dral, 2005). A “conflict in the application of tax rules” – a term that actually denotes 
tax avoidance (Soler Roch, 2004) – arises where: (1) the taxpayer avoids the taxable 
event or reduces the taxable basis or tax payable through transaction which is highly 
artificial or not typical for the achievement of the result obtained, or (2) the transac-
tion achieves material legal or economic effects or benefits that differ from those 
that would have resulted from a non-artificial transaction. 
The application of a GAAR requires the Spanish tax authorities to make it evident 
that an abuse of law has occurred. This is achieved via comparison of the tax-
payer’s behaviour with the intention of verifying whether the businesses or trans-
actions are genuine or artificial. The Spanish General Tax Code sets out an admin-
istrative requirement for the GAAR’s application. A special report on tax abuse – 
which is binding on the tax auditor (De Monès et al., 2010) – needs to be issued 
by the special advisory committee comprising two representatives from the cen-
tral government and two representatives of the acting tax administration. The tax-
payer is given 15 days to present a case, and the committee then issues its findings s
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289 (Tooma, 2008). The Spanish tax authorities and courts apply tax law in broad 
terms, instead of specifically applying GAAR. In cases of applying provisions on 
GAAR, tax authorities are required to produce a report justifying the application 
of GAAR to the transaction. The consequence of application of GAAR to a con-
flict in the application of tax regulations is the elimination of tax benefits and the 
charging of interest for late payment. In case of shams, penalties may apply too. 
From the tax policy perspective, tendencies in Spain favour reliance on an in-
creased number of TAARs rather than a broad use of the GAAR (Clifford Chance, 
2013). 
There are two main anti-avoidance tools in Italian legislation. Alongside various 
TAARs, a rule introduced in 1997 (Article 37bis of the Decree No. 600/1973) al-
lows the tax authorities to disregard transactions lacking a valid economic pur-
pose, aimed at circumventing obligations or providing undue tax reductions (De 
Monès et al., 2010). This rule is widely applied, but in fact is not a GAAR since it 
is limited to the specific list of transactions. Hence, it can be concluded that it falls 
between a GAAR and a TAAR. Through strict implementation of the principle of 
legality and through broadening the scope of rule contained in Art. 37bis, Italian 
case law has evolved as if it contained a GAAR. Since 2005 Italian courts have 
taken a flexible anti-avoidance approach, allowing the tax authorities to declare 
tax benefits derived from certain transactions ineffective. The Italian Supreme 
Court played the crucial role, asserting that the absence of explicit anti-avoidance 
provisions does not prevent tax authorities or the courts declaring taxpayers’ 
transactions void and collecting taxes, based upon the application of civil law 
doctrines such as the doctrine of abuse of law (Cordeiro Guerra and Mastellone, 
2009). This new development – amounting to the creation of a GAAR by the ju-
diciary – is defended by the Supreme Court on the grounds of the ability to pay 
principle, enshrined in Article 53 of the Italian Constitution (Garbarino, 2012), but 
is also influenced by the anti-abuse doctrine of the CJEU (Soler Roch, 2012). 
Consequently, Italian tax authorities are now more open to applying the rule con-
tained in Art. 37bis or the more general abuse of law principle in their efforts to 
curb tax avoidance schemes (Ernst & Young, 2013). A transaction is considered 
abusive if it is aimed at avoiding taxes, if any tax benefit or saving is a dominant 
reason for carrying it out or if there are no clear economic reasons for entering it. 
In practice, GAAR is mostly used in cases of misapplication of tax provisions in 
transactions which are not fraudulent, but aimed at obtaining a tax benefit. The 
burden of proof falls on the Italian tax authorities, i.e. they have to demonstrate 
the tax advantage derived from the transaction and the elements proving that it is 
abusive. In contrast, taxpayers may provide clear and significant business reasons 
to justify the transaction. In case of re-characterization of an abusive transaction 
by the tax authorities, tax rates that would have been applied had the abusive 
transaction not been entered into will be applied. According to the Supreme Court, 
penalties or criminal sanctions are not applicable to transactions deemed as abu-
sive (Clifford Chance, 2013).s
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290 The Portuguese GAAR sets out that any transaction implemented by artificial or 
fraudulent means or by abusing legal forms and wholly or mainly aimed at reduc-
ing, avoiding or postponing taxes that would be payable as result of transactions 
with the same economic purpose or to obtain tax advantages that would not be 
achieved without the use of these means, is ineffective for tax purposes. Taxation 
should proceed in accordance with the rules that would have applied in their ab-
sence. The tax advantages intended to be achieved by this transaction may not 
arise (Santiago, Salema and Carvalho Nunes, 2011). This rule was introduced in 
the Portuguese legal system in 1999, under influence of other European countries, 
along with the introduction of TAARs, e.g. on transfer pricing and thin capitaliza-
tion. Although the GAAR had not been applied for over a decade, the number of 
cases where it was applied recently considerably increased. The aim of these rules 
was to guarantee compliance with the principles of equality in financing public 
expenditures. The GAAR has proven to be difficult to apply as the burden of proof 
falls on the tax authorities, thus weakening the preventative character of the rule. 
The tax authorities have instead mostly applied TAARs, where the burden of proof 
falls upon the taxpayer (Fernandes Ferreira, Respício Gonçalves and Bordalo e 
Sá, 2011).
4 AntI-AvoIdAnce polIcy In croAtIA: A proposAl
During the transition era of the 1990s a new tax system suitable for the market-
oriented economy had to be created in Croatia (Arbutina et al., 2014). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that tax evasion was perceived as a more important tax policy 
issue than tax avoidance. Over the years various interventions in the tax statutes 
have been made with the aim of curbing some recognised tax avoidance tech-
niques. The importance of legislative instruments in this area should be empha-
sized, as Croatia has both a civil law legal system with strong adherence to the 
constitutional principle of legality and a long tradition of the literal interpretation 
of the law by the courts (Aviani and Đerđa, 2012). Against this backdrop, the dy-
namics of changes to the anti-avoidance legislative framework reveal that Croatia 
lacks a coherent anti-avoidance policy (Prebble, 2005). In comparison to other 
countries, the Croatian approach to this important tax policy issue is both under-
developed and fragmented. 
4.1 exIstInG AntI-AvoIdAnce leGIslAtIve frAmework In croAtIA
The obligation to pay taxes in Croatia, as in other countries, stems from the con-
stitutional principle of ability to pay. Namely, Article 51 of the Constitution lays it 
down that every person should participate in the defrayment of public expenses in 
accordance with his or her economic capacity. The Constitution further stipulates 
that the tax system should be based upon the principles of equality and equity, 
establishing the paramount objectives of Croatian tax policy. These constitutional 
principles are reflected in manifold statutory provisions. For example, Art. 9 of the 
General Tax Act (GTA) obliges the parties of the tax relationship to act in good 
faith, i.e. to conduct themselves conscientiously and fairly in accordance with the s
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291 law. Tax avoidance behaviour undermines the attainment of both dimensions of 
equity. Horizontal equity is endangered since the share of the tax burden borne by 
two taxpayers with equal economic faculty differs depending on their usage of tax 
planning schemes. Vertical equity is endangered since tax avoidance schemes – 
particularly the most notorious corporate tax shelters revolving around interna-
tional tax arbitrage – are largely a privilege of high income earners, lowering the 
effective tax system’s progressivity. Consequently, anti-avoidance legislative in-
struments in Croatia – including a GAAR – can be justified by this constitutional 
principle, which is similar to the approach taken by the judiciary in Italy (see sec-
tion 3.3). 
Croatian tax legislation does not contain a GAAR (Rogić Lugarić and Bogovac, 
2012). However, certain provisions which follow the same underlying objectives 
as a GAAR – even if lacking its breadth – can be found. Of special importance is 
the provision found in Art. 10(1) GTA, effectively codifying the substance-over-
form principle in the process of determining tax facts. This provision – labelled 
“the economic approach principle”– sets out that “(T)ax facts shall be determined 
according to their economic essence”. Additionally, Art 10(2) GTA provides that 
“(I)f the revenue, income, profit or other assessable benefit was acquired without 
a legal basis, the tax authority shall determine the tax liability in accordance with 
a special law regulating certain types of taxes”. The implementation of this prin-
ciple allows the tax administration to tax profit acquired even by a criminal act, 
with the basic idea of taxing the underlying economic substance, while the gen-
eral character of a legal action that led to the profit is irrelevant for tax law (Rogić 
Lugarić and Bogovac, 2012). Hence, some consider it to be a potentially power- 
ful anti-avoidance rule, comparable to a GAAR (KPMG, 2013). However, even 
though their intent corresponds to that of a GAAR, these provisions are extremely 
vague and do not provide further instructions for application to the tax authorities. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that – while the provisions on the economic ap-
proach principle have been in force since 2001 – their anti-avoidance potential has 
hitherto not been recognized by the tax authorities.
By similar token, an anti-avoidance rule aimed at preventing the abuse of legal 
form, i.e. codification of the sham doctrine, is found in Art. 11 GTA: “If a sham 
transaction conceals another legal transaction, the basis of the assessment of tax 
liability shall be that concealed legal transaction.” On the basis of this provision 
tax authorities can requalify the transaction and neglect the form contracting par-
ties have chosen for the transaction. The transaction will therefore be considered 
to have been concluded in the legal form which corresponds with the real inten-
tion of contracting parties (Šimović et al., 2010). While it is contended that this 
provision is seldom applied by the tax authorities, some authors argue that it 
should gain more importance in the future, especially with regards to transactions 
that involve real estate purchases via business shares sales (Kapetanović, 2010; 
Prebble and Prebble, 2008). s
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292 Additionally, various TAARs can be found in Croatian tax legislation, mostly re-
lated to corporate income taxation. For instance, a rule targeted at thin capitaliza-
tion as well as a rule setting a higher rate of withholding tax on certain payments 
made to residents of expressly listed tax haven countries are contained in the Cor-
porate Income Tax Act (CITA). From the tax policy perspective it is very interest-
ing that some of the most controversial changes of tax legislation of late – includ-
ing the new TAARs – seemingly reflected the awareness that tax avoidance needs 
to be restrained. Yet, no one single theory underlying the anti-avoidance approach 
in tax legislation can be identified. 
The abuse of law doctrine – deeply rooted in Croatian civil law – was used to 
justify the GTA amendments of 2012, laying down a special procedure for “pierc-
ing the corporate veil” in tax matters (Žunić Kovačević and Gadžo, 2013). The 
amendments provoked intense reactions of the business community as sharehold-
ers, board members and executive directors of a company – as well as persons 
associated with them – can be declared to be liable for a company’s tax debt by the 
tax authorities, under condition that the abuse of rights or power leading to com-
pany’s inability to pay the tax debt is established. On the other hand, one distinc-
tive TAAR was included in the CITA amendments of 2012 that introduced a tax 
benefit for reinvestment of company profits. Namely, the corporate income tax 
base can be reduced by the amount of company’s capital increase made for invest-
ment and development purposes. From the outset, policymakers have recognized 
the tax avoidance potential of this benefit (Jozipović, 2013) and introduced a 
TAAR, which stipulates that the entitlement to reduce the corporate income tax 
will not be granted if it is obvious that the intention of the company’s capital in-
crease was tax evasion or tax avoidance. Examination of taxpayer’s purpose as a 
condition for the application of anti-avoidance rule is what makes this specific 
TAAR similar to GAARs found in other tax systems. 
The wording of the abovementioned TAAR is to some extent comparable to that 
of the TAARs applicable in the context of three EU direct tax directives. The pro-
visions of the Merger Directive (European Council, 1990a, hereinafter: MD), Par-
ent-Subsidiary Directive (European Council, 1990b, hereinafter: PSD) and Inter-
est-Royalties Directive (European Council, 2003, hereinafter: IRD) were imple-
mented in Croatian legislation – mostly in CITA and in the Ordinance on Corpo-
rate Income Taxation – during the process of accession to the EU. It appears that 
the Croatian legislator opted for a uniform anti-avoidance approach in the tax di-
rectives context, even if the wording of different TAARs is not identical. Conse-
quently, the benefits of the MD, PSD and IRD are to be denied if the principal 
purpose or one of the principal purposes of the pertinent transaction/arrangement 
is tax evasion or tax avoidance. It can be concluded that the harmonization of 
Croatian tax law with the EU law requirements brought about some important 
changes to the approach in the design of anti-avoidance legislation. More specifi-
cally, the taxpayer’s purpose as the subjective element of the transaction – previ-
ously not acknowledged in the delimitation of tax avoidance – is now a recognized s
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293 constitutive element of tax avoidance, albeit in a limited number of TAARs. The 
indubitable influence of the EU law on the Croatian anti-avoidance law provides 
a point of departure for future policy choices in this area. 
4.2   proposAl for the IntroductIon of the “eu GAAr” In croAtIA: 
prIncIple of leGAl certAInty As A stArtInG poInt
The preceding overview of Croatian anti-avoidance legislation may lead to the 
conclusion that the introduction of a GAAR was considered to be unnecessary by 
the policymakers and the policy choice was to rely on TAARs as key anti-avoid-
ance tools. In our view this would be misleading. A more detailed analysis of 
legislative dynamics in this area reveals that Croatian tax policymakers do not 
have a coherent anti-avoidance approach. What is particularly worrying is the 
absence of uniform criteria used in the all-important line-drawing process, i.e. in 
delimiting the tax avoidance notion (see section 2.2). As demonstrated above, in 
some cases – e.g. during application of the GTA provisions on sham transactions 
and in “piercing the corporate veil” cases – the abuse of law or abuse of rights by 
the taxpayer is the defining element of tax avoidance. Here the purpose of the 
taxpayer’s transaction/arrangement – be it a tax-saving or any other commercially 
justified purpose – is rendered unimportant. In other cases – e.g. when applying 
TAAR concerned with the tax benefit for reinvested profits or TAARs implement-
ing the provisions of EU direct tax directives – the taxpayer’s purpose is the es-
sential element. 
As described above (see section 3.1) the CJEU considers both the objective crite-
ria, i.e. abuse of pertinent law, and the subjective criteria, i.e. taxpayer’s purpose, 
as constitutive elements of tax avoidance. Therefore, the reconciliation of differ-
ing criteria in delimiting tax avoidance in Croatia is possible if viewed in the light 
of EU law requirements. In fact, Croatian tax authorities and courts are already 
obliged to adhere to the CJEU’s notion of tax avoidance whenever applying na-
tional anti-avoidance rules on transactions/arrangements that are covered by the 
provisions of EU law. More leeway is allowed only with regards to strictly na-
tional and third-country (non-EU member states) situations. 
That is where failures of delineating tax avoidance notion in a clear and consistent 
way could have serious consequences. For example, it is very unclear how the 
Croatian tax authorities will determine tax avoidance intent with regards to the tax 
benefit for reinvested profits, as no further instructions for the application of this 
TAAR were given in tax legislation or in the tax authorities’ non-binding opin-
ions. Furthermore, the role of the abuse of law principle in future developments of 
anti-avoidance legislation remains uncertain. Will the policymakers rely on this 
principle in introducing new anti-avoidance rules, following the pattern of the 
provisions on piercing the corporate veil in tax matters? In this context the utter 
absence of debate between the stakeholders – including the Ministry of Finance, 
which is the key player in the development of Croatian tax policy (Arbutina et al., 
2014) – about the desired anti-avoidance approach, e.g. about the GAAR – TAARs s
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294 dilemma, also needs to be stressed. It follows that the taxpayers in Croatia are not 
able to determine the tax implications of their activities in advance, i.e. that the 
requirements of legal certainty have not been met (see section 2.3). This is con-
firmed by the findings of one recent study, stressing that the defects of legal cer-
tainty in tax matters are perceived in the Croatian business community as the main 
tax obstacle to inbound foreign investments (Rogić Lugarić and Bogovac, 2012). 
In our view the Croatian tax system provides a perfect example how the introduc-
tion of a GAAR can actually enhance legal certainty, contrary to the standard ar-
gument that a GAAR defeats this rule of law value. Frequent changes in the anti-
avoidance legislation – primarily the introduction of the new TAARs – mirror the 
general problem of the Croatian tax system ever since its comprehensive reform 
in 1994: the instability of the legislative framework (Bejaković, 2009; Žunić 
Kovačević, 2012). As the line between acceptable tax planning and unacceptable 
tax avoidance has not been properly drawn – either in the tax statutes or by the 
judiciary – the anti-avoidance policy in Croatia has hitherto worked to the detri-
ment of legal certainty. A GAAR – even if inherently vague to some extent – can 
draw this missing line in a meaningful way, providing appropriate guidelines to 
the tax authorities and courts, which traditionally rely on the literal interpretation 
of the law, overlooking the underlying policy objectives. An analysis of the impli-
cations of the reformed GAAR in Spain – a country with a comparable legal tradi-
tion and a similar attitude of courts to tax law interpretation – is in line with these 
conclusions (Ruiz Almendral, 2005). 
It must be noted that the design features of a GAAR are decisive for the evaluation 
of its potential influence on legal certainty. Against this backdrop, we share the 
view that a Croatian GAAR should be modelled after the proposal made by the 
European Commission in 2012 (see section 3.2). As examined above, some anti-
avoidance provisions that are already in place in Croatian tax system share certain 
common features with the proposed EU GAAR. But the main advantage of intro-
ducing the EU GAAR – observed through the lens of legal certainty – is that that 
its wording – based upon the EU law as interpreted by the CJEU – provides very 
detailed guidelines on the delimitation of tax avoidance behaviour to the tax au-
thorities, courts and the taxpayers themselves. Likewise, the CJEU can be relied 
upon to clarify the inevitable ambiguities that will appear in the future practice 
(Clifford Chance, 2013). Moreover, legal certainty could be enhanced via some 
instruments accompanying a GAAR. The establishment of a specialized GAAR 
panel (for the Spanish model see section 3.3), introduction of advance rulings 
  issued by the tax authorities on the taxpayer’s request (Žunić Kovačević, 2013) 
and a broader use of the tax authorities’ public opinions clarifying the practices in 
the GAAR application could serve this purpose. 
The EU GAAR in Croatian tax system should be underpinned by TAARs – some 
already in force – addressing some distinctive tax avoidance techniques, but re-
flecting the same general concept of tax avoidance as defined by a GAAR. When-
ever a TAAR is applicable, the tax authorities should not have the option of invok-s
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295 ing a GAAR – in line with the lex specialis doctrine – thus enhancing legal cer-
tainty. Usage of a GAAR as a last resort is also confirmed in comparative surveys 
(Clifford Chance, 2013). Another legislative instrument worth considering in the 
future development of coherent anti-avoidance policy in Croatia is the introduc-
tion of rules requiring that taxpayers disclose the usage of specific tax shelters to 
the tax authorities; this has proved to be efficacious in the USA (Kaye, 2012). 
4.3   prospects of “eu GAAr” In the AttAInment of other  
polIcy objectIves
It has been argued above that anti-avoidance tax policy is about finding the right 
balance in attaining multiple objectives (see section 2.3). Hence, legal certainty is 
not the only objective policymakers ought to be concerned with when deciding on 
the introduction of a GAAR. The principle of tax equity – as stipulated by the 
Constitution – is the paramount objective of Croatian tax policy. As tax avoidance 
behaviour undermines the attainment of equity – as well as inflicting economi-
cally wasteful social costs – the development of a coherent anti-avoidance ap-
proach needs to rank high on the Croatian tax policymakers’ agenda. 
While the above analysis points out the inadequacies of the existing anti-avoid-
ance legislative framework, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the actual 
extent of tax avoidance in Croatia, which could provide an impetus for reforms. 
On the other hand, some conclusions can be inferred by analysing the factors com-
monly associated with tax evasion and avoidance (International Tax Compact, 
2010). It seems that most of these factors – e.g. low tax morale, a large informal 
sector of economy, high corruption, frequent changes of tax legislation, etc. – are 
present in Croatia. Moreover, the nature and the extent of tax expenditures in 
Croatian tax system – necessarily leading to avoidance opportunities (Tyson, 
2014) – opens wide scope for abusive taxpayer behaviour. Admittedly, this has 
been recognized by the policymakers at least to some extent, as shown by some of 
the more recent changes in the tax legislation. For example, the introduction of the 
provisions on tax benefit provided for the reinvestment of corporate profits was 
accompanied by a special anti-avoidance rule. Moreover, other measures aimed 
against tax non-compliance were also introduced, e.g. establishment of the special 
tax administration unit focusing on large taxpayers, relaxation of tax secrecy pro-
visions allowing the publication of tax debtors’ blacklists, etc. While this clearly 
reflects a tax-gap narrowing policy, it was most likely motivated by the objectives 
much more mundane than the objectives of tax equity and tax efficiency. 
More specifically, tax reforms in Croatia ever since the outbreak of the latest eco-
nomic crisis – which is showing no signs of waning – were driven by the ensuing 
pressures of fiscal consolidation (Arbutina et al., 2014). Very soon after its acces-
sion to the EU, Croatia – failing to meet the fiscal targets set out in the EU legisla-
tion – entered the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), with its public finances 
placed under monitoring by the EU institutions. Whereas there seems to be an s
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296 agreement in the tax community that there is no space for the further increase of 
the overall tax burden – especially considering the heavy tax burden on consump-
tion and labour – the potential fiscal effects of the policy aimed at enhancing tax 
compliance have been largely overlooked. Experiences of other crisis-stricken EU 
member states (e.g. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus) demonstrate that one of the 
conditions for the EU financial assistance is the development of a strategic ap-
proach in fixing structural deficiencies of the national tax system, including the 
approach to tax compliance (Lyons, 2013). In this context, improvement of anti-
avoidance legislation can send a strong signal both to the EU institutions and to 
the financial markets that Croatia is dedicated to following a fiscally responsible 
tax gap narrowing policy. 
All of the abovementioned policy objectives could be promoted by the introduction 
of the EU GAAR in Croatian tax legislation, similar to that included in the recent 
legislative changes in Greece (see section 3.2). Even if this specific GAAR pro- 
posed by the EC is criticised by some authors for its lack of flexibility in combating 
tax avoidance (Faulhaber, 2010), in our view it would still provide a solid founda-
tion for curbing those types of taxpayer activities that are blatantly abusive. Since 
the tax authorities would be provided with a clear set of guidelines – aligned with 
CJEU case law – on the GAAR’s application, there would be no justification for 
shying away from invoking this rule in practice and relying solely on its deterrent 
effect. Tax authorities’ power to tax pertinent transactions/arrangements with re-
gards to their economic substance clearly promotes the attainment of tax equity and 
tax efficiency; it safeguards taxation in accordance with the taxpayers’ activities 
which are economically rational, disregarding the complex strokes of an account-
ant’s or a tax lawyer’s pen. Additionally, the development of a coherent anti-avoid-
ance framework – with the GAAR as its keystone – can have significant revenue 
effects, mostly due to its positive influence on the overall tax compliance. 
One final policy objective that can be attained by the introduction of EU GAAR 
in Croatia is its potential for the improvement of tax competitiveness. Its introduc-
tion would entail that the same anti-avoidance approach is to be followed by the 
Croatian tax authorities and courts irrespective of the context – i.e. national, EU 
or third country context – in which an arrangement is undertaken. In this respect 
Croatia would have simpler and more attractive anti-avoidance framework than 
other EU member states countries that have developed complex anti-avoidance 
strategies over the years (for an Italian example see chapter 3.3). This is a point 
that deserves special emphasis in times when countries are increasingly relying on 
their tax systems’ features to attract foreign inbound investments. Admittedly, it is 
very hard to envisage the impact of the changes in the anti-avoidance legislation 
on the total level of foreign direct investment, since the introduction of a more 
stringent and potentially uncertain anti-avoidance approach is perceived nega-
tively from the investors’ perspective, as evidenced by the highly contested debate 
on the introduction of a GAAR in India (Devi Ravi, 2012). s
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297 5 conclusIon
The approach to tax avoidance is currently high on the tax policy agenda through-
out the world and is probably here to stay. At least until satisfactory solutions are 
found for some of the most notorious avoidance schemes that exploit the short-
comings of international tax rules and the lack of cooperation between different 
tax authorities. In the meantime many countries have opted for the introduction of 
various legislative instruments with the aim of curbing tax avoidance and protect-
ing their tax base from further erosion. Global trends indicate that GAARs are 
perceived  as  keystones  of  anti-avoidance  legislation,  particularly  in  countries 
where tax authorities and courts traditionally refrain from taking a proactive ap-
proach to combating taxpayers’ abusive behaviour. While it must be conceded that 
GAAR is not a “magic bullet” for a multifaceted phenomenon like tax avoidance, 
the necessity for legislative measures aimed at curtailing it cannot be denied (Zim-
mer, 2002; Tax Law Review Committee, 1997). The main function of a GAAR is 
that it draws a line between acceptable tax planning and unacceptable tax avoid-
ance, thus having a potential of achieving multiple tax policy objectives. 
The analysis presented in this paper shows that Croatia lacks any genuine and 
coherent anti-avoidance policy. Hitherto the policymakers have not recognized 
the potential of a GAAR for attaining multiple desired tax policy objectives. We 
share the view that the time is right for the introduction of a GAAR modelled after 
the EU GAAR endorsed by the European Commission. Several policy arguments 
are provided in support of this view. Firstly, promoting legal certainty, along with 
the constitutional principle of tax equity, should be one of the main objectives of 
Croatian tax policy in the time to come. Introduction of the EU GAAR in Croatian 
tax legislation could improve legal certainty, primarily since the copious case law 
of the CJEU can provide detailed guidelines on the application of a GAAR to all 
parties of the tax relationship. Additionally, other policy objectives – i.e. tax eq-
uity, tax efficiency, revenue collection, tax competitiveness – could also be at-
tained with the suggested legislative changes. A point that deserves special em-
phasis in the light of the enduring macroeconomic problems in Croatia is the sig-
nificance of a coherent anti-avoidance framework on the tax gap narrowing policy 
and hence for the construction of a sustainable public finance system. The experi-
ences of other crisis-stricken EU member states show that the adoption of a GAAR 
(or its strengthening) is a standard policy choice in this context. s
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